Studying Translation Studies (guest essay by missionary John R. Himes)

John Himes is a 30-year veteran missionary to Japan and is currently working on a new translation of the New Testament from Greek to Japanese


Let’s say you’re an aspiring Bible translator, or perhaps a struggling translator. Where do you get help, other than going to a school that teaches Bible translation (which are few and far between)? Chances are your local Christian bookstore will have nothing to help, and the Internet is not much more help. Searching an online bookstore would give you many more results than you want, most unrelated, and few Bible translators discuss their art on line (and it is an art).

So how do you get started studying on your own? I’m here to help. In the last few decades an entirely new scholarly discipline has grown up in the secular world called translation studies. Scholars in this field acknowledge the contributions of Bible translators in this area, starting with Jerome on through Eugene Nida of dynamic equivalence fame. (DE; Nida changed the method’s name to functional equivalence, but most scholars still use the DE moniker.) It is a good time to study how to be a translator.

First of all, let’s consider what is available which is written by actual Bible translators. Strangely enough, many who write on the subject have not actually done translation, including the famed Nida. (To be fair, he served as a consultant on many projects, so he did know the field.) Let’s start with James Price, the Old Testament editor of the NKJV. His first book on translation, Complete Equivalence in Bible Translating (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Pub., 1987), is a good basic book on the literal method, contra dynamic equivalence. His other book, A Theory For Biblical Translation: An Optimal Equivalence Model (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), is excellent, but a very scholarly work for which a good knowledge of both Hebrew and transformational grammar is necessary.

The little book Translating Truth (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2005) is another book on the literal method, in particular the method of the ESV translators. It has articles by Wayne Grudem, Leland Ryken, C. John Collins, Vern S. Poythress, and Bruce Winter. They call their method “essentially literal,” and this book will be a help for the aspiring translator. Particularly interesting is the chapter by Wayne Grudem on the theological basis for literal translating.

A somewhat different method is described by fundamentalist Charles Turner in Biblical Bible Translating (2nd ed. Lafayette, IN: Sovereign Grace Publ., Inc., 2001). Having worked on a tribal translation in Papua, New Guinea, Turner teaches a somewhat freer method of translation designed for tribal translation work. One good point about his book is its practicality. For example, he includes a chart which the translator can use to record the progress of the translation book by book, chapter by chapter, and in percentages and number of verses per book.

Translating the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publ. Co, 2009), edited by Stanley E. Porter and Mark J. Boda, has a number of good articles about where Bible translation theory is today. Though it is a somewhat technical book written by and perhaps for scholars, the missionary translator will find some help in it.

Here is one last suggestion in the area of Bible translation. Even a translator using a literal method should be familiar with Eugene Nida’s DE method. I suggest his last book on the method written with Jan De Waard: One Language to Another: Functional Equivalence in Bible Translation (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1986).

Bridging the gap between Bible translation and secular translation, we find Ernst-August Gutt, who is both a Bible translator and a linguist. In his book Relevance Theory (Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics, and New York: United Bible Societies, 1992), Gutt applies the comparatively recent relevance theory of communication to Bible translating. While I believe the Bible stands on its own as revealed truth, making the literal method the best, relevance theory still is helpful in understanding how the target audience will receive the translation. In this respect I consider it much better than the code theory underlying DE.

In the area of secular translation studies, Susan Bassnet has written an excellent basic textbook, Translation Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 1980, 1991, 2002). Of particular help are the chapters on “Central Issues” and “The History of Translation theory.” She does touch on Bible translation, noting the same thing about DE that James Price does in his book mentioned above: “Even in his simplified theory, Nida does not tell us how the deep structure transfer occurs” (p. 57).

Edwin Gentzler has written a great introduction to the main theories of translation studies, Contemporary Translation Theories (Revised 2^nd ed. Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 2001). Of particular interest to the Bible translator are the sections on skopos theory and “scientific” theories. (As with many secular scholars, he gives due credit to Eugene Nida for his pioneering work in the field, while being dismissive of DE itself.)

A similar book is Key Terms in Translation Studies by Giuseppe Palumbo (New York: Continuum International Publ. Group, 2009). Palumbo deals well not only with the terminology, but with the main theories and methodologies and their proponents.

Finally, in the field of secular translation studies, no brief list of recommendations would be complete without a book by Lawrence Venuti. He is the editor of The Translation Studies Reader (2nd ed. New York and London: Routledge, 2004), which should certainly be on the reading list of any grad class on translation. In this book you have several gems helpful for Bible translators, such as a new translation of Jerome’s “Letter to Pammachius” by Kathleen Davis, Fredrich Schleiermacher’s “On the Different methods of Translation” etc. Of the books Venuti himself authored, I highly recommend The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference (New York and London: Routledge, 1998). This book will help the reader understand Venuti’s influential division of works into foreignizing and domesticating translations.

And there you have it. If you are serious about translation studies, this will get you started. Happy reading!

David Stark on NT and Qumran Hermeneutics: Congratulations on a Successful Dissertation Defense!

A few weeks ago I had the privilege of sitting in on my friend David Stark's successful dissertation defense. His dissertation was entitled "The Hermeneutical Roles of the Teacher of Righteousness and of Jesus of Nazareth in the Qumran Sectarian Manuscripts and in the Epistle to the Romans." His academic advisor was Dr. Andreas Köstenberger. His 2nd reader was Dr. Benjamin Merkle, and his outside reader was none other than Dr. James Charlesworth from Princeton seminary.

Dr. David Stark's dissertation was definitely unique in that he incorporates Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolution into his theological investigation. Here, with David's permission, is the abstract of his ably-defended dissertation:

"Thomas Kuhn’s arguments about scientific paradigms and their shifts can illuminate the paradigms through which Paul and the Qumran community interpreted their scriptures. The Qumran community experienced a paradigm shift because of their encounter with the Teacher of Righteousness. Within the community’s new paradigm, the Teacher of Righteousness determined certain, specific facets of the presuppositional matrix through which the Qumran community interpreted their scriptures. Similarly, Paul experienced a paradigm shift because of his encounter with Jesus, and within Paul’s new paradigm, Jesus determined certain, specific facets of the presuppositional matrix through which Paul interpreted his scriptures. Nevertheless, although Paul and the Qumran community had similar core canons, similar interpretive methods, and similar patterns of religion, the differences between the figures to which they owed their allegiance shaped different hermeneutical paradigms and different patterns of valid interpretations. These differences further reinforced Paul and the Qumran community’s distinctive patterns of religion."

Congratulations, David, and may the Lord bless your future work!

A Different Kind of Theodicy

At SEBTS, doctoral students are generally required to take an one-credit "integrative seminar" class with Dr.  Bruce Little on critical thinking (one of the tougher yet more beneficial classes I've taken). In his book A Creation-Order Theodicy: God and Gratuitious Evil (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2005), Dr. Little presents his development of a theodicy that provides an alternative to the usual "greater-good" theodicies so often seen in Christian philosophy.

A theodicy is a defense of the existence of God in light of the existence of evil. A standard "greater-good" theodicy is the argument, more or less, that "all evil in the world could be justified on grounds that God permits only that evil from which He can bring a greater good or prevent some greater evil" (Little, 2).

Little provides a rigerous analysis and critique of the "greater-good"theodicies of John Hick, Richard Swinburne, and Michael Peterson (see Little's helpful summarizing chart on page 93). Little's first three objections to greater-good theodicies argue that, first, greater-good theodicies logically lead to the conclusion that, if "God allows all evil that comes into the world because from it He will bring about some greater good," and if such good "is a necessary good,"then evil becomes a necessity because the good that God brings about would not be possible without the evil that leads to it. The result is that "if the evil is necessary, then God must determine the evil in order to assure it will come to pass so that the good can obtain" (Little, 112). Secondly, if God uses evil to bring about good, then would not this lead to the conclusion that, at least for God, the end justifies the means? Thus one does not have to be truly concerned over evil, for it will ultimately work out for the good (Little, 113-114), leading to his third objection that greater good theodicies have the potential to detract from the Chrisian's responsibility for social justice and compassion (Little, 115-117). See the follneowing pages for further discussion of shortcomings in a greater-good theodicy.

Although I am not totall convinced  of all his objections (especially the second one, in light of Genesis 50:20), nevertheless Little makes an excellent case for some of the shortcomings of certain greater-good theodicies and their perceieved inability to counter the concerns of atheists and agnostics.

Little's alternative is worth looking into. He follows Augustine in arguing that evil should not be viewed of as a "thing" so much as the lack of good, or "a condition of privation in something that is good" (134). Thus, for God himself and his interaction within the Trinity, there is only perfect good and no hint of evil (135-137). Little's theodicy ultimately builds on the difference between God's interaction within himself and his interaction with man. Ultimately, "man's power of moral choice equipped him to live properly within the moral order God desinged for humanity. Any deviation was de to man's creaturely freedom and a misuse of the freedom he had been given. The consequences of man's rebellion although it was very severe did not go beyond the bounds of God's knowledge, nor did it in any way change the counsels of God" (142). Contra greater-good theodicies, Little acknowledges the existence of "gratuitous evil"; thus, Little's "Creation-Order" theodicy "recognizes the reality of gratutious evil while maintaining that God is morally justified in permitting such" (161). Ultimately, God has created man in his image in such a way that "alows for gratuitous evil as a corollary to the authenticity fo the power of moral choices" without denying God's providential control oer the universe, i.e. gratuitous evil is never allowed to "jeapardize the counsels of God or exceed the providential power of God" (161-163). Thus Little places a heavy emphasis on human choice as reflecting the image of God.

In answer to the question, "is it possible that God could prevent the most horrific evils and still honor the power of moral choice?" Little points out that although God could prevent any evil, if "evil act A" is the most horrific, and God prevents that, then by default "evil act B" becomes the most horrific evil and so on down the line. Thus the mere existence of evil guarantees that there will always be a "most horrific evil," but no particular evil is absolutely necessary (163-164).

Two quick points: Little seems to follow the "best of all possible worlds" view, though this is not as apparent until later in the book (esp. 176-177). Naturally this alone would require a separate analysis from the reader. Secondly, in regards to his critique of greater-good theodicy, Little is not arguing that God never brings evil out of good, only that he does not necessarily do so.

I am very intrigued and attracted to Little's thesis, though time will tell whether it can replace the standard theodicies, whether they be the "greater-good" or more deterministic frameworks. At least the reader who is interested in the problem of evil should give Little a second-look.

My Apologies to L. E. Modesitt (the dangers of equating a character's viewpoints with those of the author)

In a previous post, I interacted with L. E. Modesitt, Jr.'s book entitled The Ethos Effect (Tor: 2004). In my post, I unfairly treated the viewpoints of the protagonist as those of Mr. Modesitt himself. This was both careless, unfair, and wrong of me, as Mr. Modesitt recently pointed out to me. I apologize to Mr. Modesitt and any readers of the original blog. Misrepresentation of an author is the 2nd greatest sin of writing (the first, obviously, being plagerism) The original post has been modified to clarify that it is the viewpoints of the characters, not necessarily those of Mr. Modesitt himself, that are being critiqued. The following is the statement from Mr. Modesitt (e-mail correspondance dated Friday, May 6th, 2011). This is posted with his permission (e-mail correspondance, May 7th, 2011), and he has graciously accepted my apology.

[beginning of correspondance]

"Dear Mr. Himes:

I have to say that I was somewhat surprised and greatly disappointed about your blog which discussed the philosophical points raised by my book -- The Ethos Effect. 

You certainly have the right, and in view of your beliefs, the duty to dispute ethical points at variance with your viewpoint.  And I have no problem with your dispute of the "beliefs" expressed in The Ethos Effect [although there are many parts of your argument I would dispute]. What you do not have the ethical right to do, however, is to assume that, out of the nearly sixty books I have published, the views expressed through characters in a single book represent or encapsulate my beliefs or views, especially since characters in other books express viewpoints which are in contradiction to those expressed in The Ethos Effect.  While I would not go quite so far as other authors who have noted that readers who assume that the beliefs of an author's characters are those of the writer are idiots, I do believe your blog goes far beyond the acceptable in claiming the beliefs expressed in the book represent my viewpoint on religion and ethics.. 

You will find different ethical viewpoints expressed many of my other novels, particularly in the current series, The Imager Portfolio, but also in Adiamante, Gravity Dreams, Empress of Eternity, Haze, and The Octagonal Raven, among others.

As a side note, I would also point out that no religion can exist without a component of humanism, since all religion on this planet exists, at least theoretically, to provide a better way of life for its believers, who are indeed human, and all doctrines, codes, revelations, from or about the divine are filtered through human perception and interpretation."

L. E. Modesitt, Jr.

[end of correspondance]

He is, of course, absolutely correct to rebuke me, and I will endeavor to be more careful in future interactions with books of fiction. For the record, Mr. Modesitt is an excellent and surprisingly deep writer (last Christmas I gave the first two books of his Corean chronicles to my best friend, a fantasy aficionado). 

Regarding the last paragraph of his statement, I can concede the point to a certain extent, though I certainly can't speak for all religions. My definition of "humanism" and "humanistic," however, refers to the viewpoint that sees the good of humanity as the telos, the primary and end goal, of existence. (see, for example, The Humanist Manifesto II, online at http://www.americanhumanist.org/Who_We_Are/About_Humanism/Humanist_Manifesto_II  [accessed 5/7/2011]; note especially the fourth paragraph in the essay proper, after the preface; the interested reader should also note that Isaac Asimov was one of the signers of the document; despite this, I still consider Asimov to be a great sci-fi writer, in his non-fiction as well as fiction)

To a certain degree Christianity and other religions do try to look out for the welfare of their adherents. Yet Christ showed compassion on all men, not just his followers (e.g. Luke 17:11-19), and Christians who fail to show compassion to those outside the faith in addition to those inside the faith have absolutely failed as Christians (e.g. Galatians 6:10, 1 Thessalonians 3:12).

Also, the point of Christianity is that we exist to the glory of God (the "supreme being," if you will), as 1 Corinthians 10:31 notes, and that anybody who joins a church or claims conversion simply on the basis of what it can do for them has missed the big picture. One does not follow Christ simply to escape judgement or for a "pie-in-the-sky" future, but rather because of Who and What he is. Furthermore, as an ideology, Christianity does not benefit from becoming closely tied to the state. One of the worst things that happened to Christianity, in my opinion, was Emperor Constantine and the eventual nationalization of Christianity. Furthermore, any Christians who attempt to force their views on others, either through the state or at the personal level, are not acting like Christians.

Mr. Modesitt is absolutely correct in the last line of his e-mail concerning "human perception and interpretation," and Christians should indeed recognize that we may be (indeed, often are) fallible in our interpretations. I would suggest, however, that this does not necessarily invalidate the concept of divine revelation itself. My own views are those of an inerrantist in regards to Scripture (in the original languages, of course), though I recognize a diversity of views regarding revelation in Christianity.

I thank Mr. Modesitt for his interaction, apologize for misrepresenting him, and look forward to reading more of his work in the future.

Christian Theological Dialogue (or, how to disagree without being a jerk)

"Be at peace among yourselves" (1 Thess 5:13, KJV)

 The setting? A Christian college dormitory. The topic? Election (of course!) A cacophony of voices rises above the normal sounds of every-day college life. Positions are vigorously debated, opponents are dismissed outright, and occasionally a voice is shrilly raised to protest somebody’s (alleged!) misrepresentation of their position. The debate continues far into the night and ends with neither side convinced of the other’s position. A few feelings have been hurt, and a few words spoken perhaps a bit too hastily.

Naturally graduation to the seminary level means that the same debate will be carried on with more intelligence, more poise, and a Kant-ian level of pure reasoning. Or perhaps not. Whatever the case, from the halls of a college dormitory to the postings on a Facebook page to the pure academic setting of a peer-reviewed journal to the coffee-fueled discussion of a Sunday school class, theological dialogue has always been and will always continue to be a part of the Christian life.

 But what, then, are the boundaries for such dialogue? When Christ are the Apostle Paul engaged in theological dialogue, they were hardly polite! Yet for those of us that lack the complete knowledge of our opponents’ hearts or the inspiration of the Holy Spirit to back our arguments, surely there must be some guidelines that, at the least, keep us edifying each other rather than tearing each other down!

 In order to facilitate some thoughts along these lines, I want to look at some examples of academic theological dialogue and then try to develop some principles that will facilitate us in our “dialogue/debate” with fellow believers on various theological issues.

 One more note: I’m incredibly grateful to the meek yet intelligent spirit shown by my fellow doctoral students at SEBTS. It seems that at the ph.d. level, we can actually disagree, have fun in the process, and still remain friends! The irony is that there is way more theological divergence between me and my friends at the doctoral level than there ever was at the college level, yet the dialogue remains significantly more cordial.

 The first example of theological dialogue we’ll look at is a positive one, between my advisor Dr. David Alan Black and Dr. Robert Stein on the Mark and the Synoptic Gospels. [let the record show, in the interest of full disclosure, that I’m fully on my advisor’s side on this one, but that’s irrelevant to my point]. Both Drs. Black and Stein are reasonably courteous in their interaction with each other, despite strong disagreements.

 In “Some Dissenting Notes on R. Stein’s The Synoptic Problem and Markan ‘Errors’” (Filologia Neotestamentarai 1 [1998]: 95-101), Dr. Black disagrees with Dr. Stein regarding whether or not Mark uses improper grammar. The nature of the disagreement is unimportant. What is important is how Dr. Black goes about disagreeing without getting overly-harsh. On page 95, Black desires “to show that Stein’s arguments fail in fact to demonstrate the peculiarities he has in mind” [regarding Markan priority based on allegedly inferior Markan grammar]. Ultimately his harshest criticism is that the Markan style is “misinterpreted by him [Stein]. . . he has suppressed information we need.” One page 98, he states, “Once again, Stein has suppressed information . . .”

This is, of course, acceptable dialogue. Claiming that somebody has misrepresented something or suppressed information is not an attack on their character, especially since Black never suggests that Stein is doing so deliberately.  Furthermore, Black interacts very closely with Stein on the evidence itself and does not introduce red herrings.

Robert Stein responds to Black in the 2^nd edition of his book and is surprisingly courteous (Studying the Synoptic Gospels: Origin and Interpretation [2^nd ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2001]. Actually, he only interacts with Black in three footnotes, so his response is not at all thorough, but nevertheless it is gentlemanly. Twice (p. 57 n11 and 58 n15) he actually concedes Black’s point that he should not have used the term “poor grammar,” but nevertheless sticks to his guns by asserting that Mark’s usage is still unusual and thus his argument is unaffected. On page 58, n13, Stein simply refers the reader to Black’s article for an alternative viewpoint (always an academically honest thing to do, though perhaps not as thorough a response as Black's article warrents).

Ultimately who is “right” on the issue is irrelevant (*cough* Dr. Black is correct *cough*). What’s important is that these two scholars strongly disagree with each other yet do not get personal. This is a good example of dialogue.

Another positive example of cordial disagreement can be found in James Barr’s monumental The Semantics of Biblical Language (Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf & Stock, 1961). Consider the following paragraph, where Barr manages to take Metzger to task while simultaneously praising him! “With respect to the scholarship of the author [Bruce Metzger], I cannot regard this paragraph as other than a romanticization . . . its contrast with the careful scientific method of the rest of Metzger’s article is very noticeable.” Notice Barr disagrees with Metzger while at the same time declaring how great a scholar Metzger is! Classy! Of course, Barr was not always so courteous to his theological opponents, but his disagreement with Metzger here is still, in my opinion, “courteous dialogue par excellence”!

Now lets move onto a theological exchange that, in my opinion, gets a bit too personal on both sides. To avoid distraction, we shall refer to the scholars as “Dr. S” and “Dr. C” (see the bibliography at the end of this article if you really need to know who they are). Once again, the nature of the argument and who is correct is irrelevant. The dialogue is found in Westminster Theological Journal 67 (Fall 2005).

In the first article, Dr. S provides us with a mostly negative review article of scholar C’s book. The article is entitled “Biblical Greek and Modern Greek: A Review Article.” To be fair, Dr. S does start on a positive note, and calls the book in question “[Dr. C’s] most impressive contribution to date” (391). Yet overall the review article is very negative, Dr. S’s two major problems with the book, what he calls its two major weaknesses, are “the tendency to overstate opinions” and “failure to make use of the advances in linguistic science over the past eighty years” (393).

So far this is not a problem. Yet in the course of the review Dr. S makes two statements that push the boundaries a little, in my opinion. On page 396, he states, “various other comments in the book make one’s head shake in disbelief” and “these and other examples of naïve argumentation are perplexing.”

The reference to “shaking one’s head in disbelief” seems to be more borne out by emotion than logic, while the use of “naïve” may really not be the best term for academic debate.

However, Dr. C’s response is more personal (pp. 405-415). He has nothing good to say about Dr. S, and his first sentence sets the tone: “[Dr. S] has attempted to write a review of my book” (405). Notice the use of the word “attempted.” The implication is that Dr. S’s article is so lousy it does not count as a real review. Later, on page 410, Dr. C. states, “As usual, [Dr. S] fails to get to grips with the contents of this chapter, though he chides me for not using modern linguistic terminology. One is tempted here to ask, why didn’t he, with his modern linguistic terminology, solve the problem of the correct pronunciation of ancient Greek?” Here the last sentence is very emotional, almost a direct attack, and has nothing to do with the overall argument. Later, on 414, Dr. C states, “The following example show’s [Dr. S] lack of feeling for the Greek language . . . no one should blame [Dr. S] for his lack of feeling for Greek. . . . but [Dr. S] perhaps could be more careful with ironizing those who do have a feeling for Greek.” Here Dr. C basically launches a direct attack on Dr. S’s ability with the Greek language. Whether Dr. C is correct in his assessment or not is irrelevant; there are other ways to disagree with somebody than to argue that they lack the same ability in Biblical Greek than you do (to be fair, Dr. C is a native Greek speaker; still, I think he goes too far here).

Finally, on 414 Dr. C states, “The entire review is an aggregate of misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and criticism of the reviewer’s own construals of my meaning.” This, of course, is simply not true since Dr. S deliberately made a point of praising certain aspects of Dr. C’s book. At best it’s a careless overstatement on the part of Dr. C.

Finally, Dr. S provides a very brief rejoinder. To his credit, he backs off on one of his points: “I accept [Dr. C’s] argument . . . in looking back at this point, I acknowledge that my assessment sounds hypocritical.” This, I think, speaks well of Dr. S’s character without detracting from his argument. It is no shame, and no weakness, to admit that you overstated your case or misrepresented your opponent. Overall, of course, Dr. S sticks to his guns and also urges the reader to analyze the disagreement for themselves, always a good thing to do.

The dialogue between Drs. S and C must still be within the acceptable scope of academic dialogue, otherwise WTJ would never have published it. Yet clearly there are some personal feelings involved, and the dialogue is not quite as commendable, perhaps, as the one between Dr. Stein and Dr. Black.

Now, then, let me make a few recommendations for theological dialogue that will hopefully equally apply to Christians no matter what the context.

1. First of all, don't get personal! If there are issues in the other person’s character that need addressing, then do so as Christ commanded you to do (Matthew 18:15-17). A theological discussion is not the place to bring such things up. Neither insulting comments nor comments directed at somebody's character have any place in theological dialogue and will just make you look like you’re still in grade school rather than seminary or Bible college. Never call into question somebody’s intelligence, piety, spirituality, walk with the Lord, motives, or devotional life! Only God knows the heart. If you seriously think that there’s a defect in your opponent’s character, confront it in the appropriate manner, not in the middle of a theological discussion (especially when others are present).

2. Closely tied to the first point, mind your terminology. There’s a whale of a difference between the terms “idiot” and “misinformed.” The latter attacks the argument of the opponent, while the former attacks the character. After all, one can still be intelligent and yet be “misinformed,” but “idiot” makes a statement about somebody’s character, a statement that we have no right to make. Similarly “absurd” is not a good term to use, since you’re portraying your opponent as dim-witted (whether they really are or not is not the point! It’s not your call to make, and only the Lord can see the heart). Instead of calling somebody’s argument “absurd,” say that it “has not taken into account all the evidence” (and then show exactly what evidence it hasn’t taken into account). I would suggest it’s okay to say that your opponent has “misrepresented” the evidence, because that may imply a simple mistake or logical lapse on their part. Do not accuse your opponent of “falsifying” the evidence, however, since that’s a moral issue and should be handled personally outside of theological debate.

3. Stay humble! Guess what?  Regarding the non-essentials of the faith, you (and I) may be wrong! Yes, that’s right; despite the hours you’ve put into thinking through the topic, despite that “killer A+ paper” you wrote for your favorite professor, despite the fact that you once personally heard “great preacher Dr. Mucky-muck” speak on the topic, despite all that, you (and I) might still be wrong. There have been thousands of people before you, and there will be thousands of people after you, who have debated this topic, and probably the vast majority of them are more intelligent than you (and I). Also, none of us are in any position to judge our opponent’s intelligence; he or she may be smarter than we are, and even if they’re not, intelligence does not necessarily mean one is right! Finally, remember that the other brother or sister in Christ has just as much of the Holy Spirit as you do, so don’t assume that you have any sort of special divine revelation on the topic.

I’m not being post-modern here (after all, there is one correct position, but it’s not necessarily mine!), nor am I referring to the essentials of the faith. I will never admit the possibility of being wrong in such matters as the deity, death, and resurrection of Christ, inspiration of Scripture, etc. But I am referring to our views on various interpretations where Scripture is not as clear as we would like it to be. As the general rule, the clearer Scripture is, the more we can be adamant in our position. On a related note, see the interesting article by Craig L. Blomberg, “The New Testament definition of heresy (or when do Jesus and the apostles really get mad?” JETS 45 (March 2002): 59-72.

4. Don’t brush aside your opponent’s arguments. If you don’t like how they cited Scripture, don’t just accuse them of proof-texting and go on your merry way. Rather, interact with them on the level of the text. If you cannot offer an alternative to their interpretation of Scripture, then you have failed to adequately answer their argument. Similarly, don’t just brush aside any sources they bring to bear on the problem. Deal with them before going on the offensive again. Instead of saying “Clearly Dr. B is missing the point because he’s a Methodist [or Baptist or Presybterian],” try saying “Dr. B’s article fails to deal with the following issues . . .”

5. Finally, remember that your treatment of others is more important that winning a theological argument! If you can’t be polite when debating election, then don’t debate! If you find yourself raising your voice, then back off and go throw a football or something. I believe Christ is more concerned that we love each other rather than that we confound each other with brilliant theological arguments.

Bibliography:

Black, David Alan. “Some Dissenting Notes on R. Stein’s The Synoptic Problem and Markan ‘Errors,’” Filologia Neotestamentaria 1 (1988): 95-101.

Blomberg, Craig L. “The New Testament definition of heresy (or when do Jesus and the apostles really get mad?” JETS 45 (March 2002): 59-72.

Caragounis, Chrys C. “The Development of Greek and the New Testament: A Response to Dr. Silva.” WTJ 67 (Fall 2005): 405-415.

Silva, Moisés. “Biblical Greek and Modern Greek: A Review Article.” WTJ 67 (Fall 2005): 391-404.

_______. “Some Comments on Professor Caragounis’s Response.” WTJ 67 (Fall 2005): 417-418.

Robert H. Stein, Studying the Synoptic Gospels: Origin and Interpretation (2^nd ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2001). Note that Stein’s first edition was written before Black’s critique and so naturally does not contain his response to Black.

Three New Articles Especially Worth Reading: Mark Matthews on 2 Peter, Armin Baum on Pseudepigrapha, and John Rhoads on Source Criticism of Josephus

From time to time I hope to alert readers to particularly interesting articles that have recently come out in the mainstream evangelical journals (though I'll probably focus on the NT; sorry!). For interested readers, the Bibliotheca Sacra journal devotes an entire section to "article reviews" (just like book reviews), while the Bird/Willits website also occasionally discusses recent articles. If anybody knows of any other sources that keep up-to-date on recent articles, please let me know in the comments section. Thanks!

I love articles that challange the consensus! In light of that, here are three recent articles that the New Testament student should definitely read: first, in the recent Bulletin for Biblical Research 21 (April 2011), Mark D. Matthews from Durham University writes on "The Genre of 2 Peter: a Comparision with Jewish and Early Christian Testaments" (pp. 51-64). Matthews does not provide a direct defense of Petrinre authorship per se (for that, see Michael Kruger's excellent article in JETS 47 (December 1999) , but what he does is to (respectfully) provide a thorough counter to Richard Bauckham's widely accepted thesis that 2 Peter should be viewed as "testament" literature that would not have been written by Peter himself. To counter Bauckham, Matthews surveys the key characteristics of testament literature (something that has rarely been done) and points out how 2 Peter differs significantly from that genre. Matthrews writes, "Certain key features persist throughout all of the formal testaments and many of the farewell speeches that are absent in 2 Peter . . . more importantly, however, is the author’s communication in the first person. The most consistent feature that is attested in all of the farewell speeches, and formal testaments is the use of the third-person narrative framework. Given the fact that first-person accounts attributed to Paul and Peter were rejected by the early church, it seems unreasonable to assume that (1) this would be an effective medium of expression if one wanted to attribute this teaching to Peter after his death or (2) that the recipients would have viewed it as a fictive, pseudepigraphal testament" (63). Matthews concludes, "as an epistle written in the first person, we can surmise that 2 Peter would have been received as either a genuine letter or a forgery" (64).
      In the same issue of BBR, Armin D. Baum (from the FTH in Giessen) challanges the argument that pseudepigraphal apocalyptic literature would not have been viewed as "deceptive" when claiming to be from a prophet that did not, in fact, write it. Baum's thesis can be summed up as follows: "The admittedly plausible assumption that at least some apocalyptic texts originated from genuine ecstatic experiences does not, however, offer any reason to suppose that thier literary attributions were not measured against the generally accepted ancient standards" (p. 91). Baum concludes by stating what should be an obvious fact that has nevertheless (in my opinion) been ignored in light of theoretical reconstructions of the ANE mind by many critical scholars: "[if an 'early Jewish apocalyptist'] published his book orthonymously under his own name, he did not intend to deceive anybody. But if he ascribed it to one of the biblical prophets, he thereby sought to misinform his audience about the actual historical origin of his apocalyptic texts" (92).
      Next, we have John H. Rhoads' article "Josephus Misdated the Census of Quirinius," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 54 (March 2011): 65-87 [don't you just love it when an author pretty much gives you his thesis in the title? Kudos to Dr. Rhoads for directness]. This whole issue of JETS is, of course, a treasure-trove because you have the articles by T. Schreiner, F. Thielman, and N. T. Wright, essentially the written manifestation of their debate [*cough* excuse me, "dialogue"] from last November's ETS meeting in Atlanta. In addition, Dr. Köstenberger has written an excellent editorial on the pros and cons of social media in the church and acadamia (quote of the month! Dr. Köstenberger regarding Facebook: "Does anybody really care that I had pancakes for breakfast?" [2]). 

       Rhoads' article is definitely worth reading, however, not only because he directly questions why Josephus should necessarily be considered an accurate source regarding the Census of Quirinius that Luke mentions in Luke 2:1-2, but also because he uses source criticism to do so! Rhoads both (1) argues why he believes Josephus was mistaken and (2) provides a rationale as to why Josephus would have dated the census when he did. The irony, of course, is that here we have a scholar utilizing source criticism (a discipline that is frequently used to disparage Scripture's claims of authenticity) to indirectly argue for Luke's credentials as a historian. If Rhoads' thesis stands, then some of the extreme critical scholars are being essentially "hoisted by their own petard."
      All three of the above articles have two things in common (besides the obvious features of being well-written and well-researched): they all find a unique argument to contribute (i.e. they are not just rehashing the debate), and they all demonstrate a good grasp of Second Temple literature. Indeed, I think it's becoming obvious that any serious student of the New Testament must famliarize himself or herself with second temple literature, and I am very grateful that my own degree at SEBTS now requires the class (and thanks to Dr. Köstenberger for teaching it)
 

Ethics, WMDs, and the Ultimate Basis of Morality: A Discussion of L. E. Modesitt Jr.'s novel The Ethos Effect

Note: this post has been modified from the original posting since I unfairly equated L. E. Modesitt's viewpoints with those of the protagonists in The Ethos Effect. I apologize to Mr. Modesitt and to the readers of the original post. My critique, then, should be viewed as interacting with the views and actions of the characters in The Ethos Effect rather than those of Mr. Modesitt himself.

This week’s post consists of a Christian interaction and critique of a piece of literature. I believe a Christian may enjoy culture to the extent that it represents the character of God; when it does not, it is the Christian’s duty to critique it from a biblical perspective. For those completely bored by science fiction but still interested in the ethical discussion, please skip to the discussion proper (marked with bold font)

         Credit where credit is due: although I do not cite him in this essay, much of my own thinking on this topic was stimulated from having read Mark D. Leiderbach, “The Gospel and War,” Faith and Mission vol. 22 (Fall 2004)

       I’ll have to confess that I’m something of a science fiction nut, and greatly value a quiet weekend evening curled up on a the couch with a wholesome book that tells a great story. While, granted, I’m sure there are more profitable ways to spend my time, one of the benefits of reading sci-fi is that every writer has a philosophical worldview (some more apparent than others), and the best sci-fi writers will challenge you to think about your own worldview and its practical application via ethics and morality (whether you agree with them or not).

         Within the sci-fi genre, writers generally reflect a variety of views on religion, some neutral, some criticial to various degrees (e.g. Isaac Asimov to Jack McDevitt), occasionally sympathetic (e.g. Timothy Zhan), while others seem to write from a religious worldview (e.g. C. S. Lewis, Dianne Thonley, and Orson Scott Card, who has an LDS background). L. E. Modesitt, Jr., seems to belong in the second group in that the themes reflected in his books are somewhat critical of organized religions, especially those of the more radical variety

         Yet Modesitt is not content to simply engage in “religion-bashing,” as is the case with some authors. Rather, his protagonists genuinely grapple with complex social and philosophical concepts while developing the narrative. The Ethos Effect is a well-written book and forces the reader to struggle through the issues along with the main protagonist.

      Summary:   

      In The Ethos Effect (New York: Tor, 2003), the protagonist, Van C. Albert, a soldier by trade, struggles with ethics and morality all throughout the book. After foiling an assassination attempt yet being subsequently retired by his superiors, he joins a private organization (the “Echo-Tech Coalition”) that is secretly manipulating the human race. Three quarters of the way through the book, Albert watches in horror as his mentor-of-sorts, Trystan, uses alien technology to complete destroy an entire sun, wiping out the homeworld of the “Revenants,” an extremely aggressive and murderous religious society that was, in the minds of the Coalition, hindering the progress of the human race.

         The ethical struggle Albert goes through is evidenced a little later in an discussion between him and the alien Farhkan:

         F: "That culture [the Revenant society] is predicated on the existence of a deity. Rules of conduct are ascribed to that deity. Those rules preclude free choice. No deity can preclude free choice. The society developed under the ascription of those rules is fatally flawed . . . rues that are  imposed in the name of a deity are always flawed. They are flawed because they are inflexible. The universe changes. Even the laws of the universe are not inflexible" (453).

         At the end of the book, Albert mimics his mentor’s actions and decimates another entire solar system, this time the seat of power of a secular state that was acting in the same aggressive manner as the Revenants. When confronted about his actions by a subordinate, the following exchange ensues (p. 535): “How can killing seven hundred million people ever be right?” [Albert]: “How about when it prevents killing millions more? Especially millions of innocents?”
         At one point, a fictional source cited at the beginning of the chapter states,

         "There is indeed an ethical absolute for any situation in which an individual may find himself (or herself), but each of those absolutes exists only for that individual and that time and situation. This individual ‘absolutism’ is not the same thing as cultural relativism, because cultures can be, and often have been, totally unethical and immoral, even by their own professed standards" (348).

         This same “source” also argues that "in practice, what is necessary for a society is a secular legal structure that affirms basic ethical principles” while allowing  nevertheless allowing anyone accused of  wrongdoing to argue that their actions were, under the circumstance, “as moral as   the situation allowed” (349).

        Discussion:

         Yet the protagonists do not clearly lay down the foundational basis for “basic ethical principles,” let alone a means of determining when exactly one’s actions may justifiably go against those principles

The case in point is the use of weapons of mass destruction and/or the total obliteration of a particular culture. The characters Albert and Trystan seem to believe that one can completely wipe out a particular society (be it religious or secular), if such action was done for the benefit of the human race as a whole. Christians, of course, may initially think themselves to be on shaky ground in the debate, since God in the Old Testament did indeed command his people to wipe out various cultures.

Yet herein lies the issue. Albert, the protagonist in The Ethos Effect, holds up the welfare of the human race as the standard. In other words, his is a truely humanistic outlook. Actions may be justified if done for the stability and/or betterment of humanity as a whole. For Albert, then, the morality of the annihilation of a planet depends on the goal that is hoped to be attained by such an action.

Now let’s bring the matter a little bit closer to home: is it morally acceptable to [deliberately] bomb civilians in war, or to annihilate an entire city à la Hiroshima or Nagasaki? For many, the answer would be “yes” if such an action would bring to close a brutal war against an evil (however “evil” is defined) enemy. Many Christians (including myself in the past) have thought along the same lines. Since the use of atomic bombs in World War II brought about the end of the war and most likely saved lives in the long run (a reasonable suggestion, in light of the bloodshed an invasion of Japan would have brought), then the bombs were justifiable.

Yet I’d like to propose an alternative way of thinking, based on a few key (in my opinion, Biblical) principles. [Digression] I am not discussing here the matter of warfare in general; I would tentatively suggest that serving in the military may be acceptable for Christians in light of the fact that Christians were not forbidden from serving in the military in the New Testament (see especially Luke 3:14; Acts 10). I would also suggest that a Christian man has a duty to protect his family and the weak from violence, but that’s a discussion for a different time. Yet even so, Christians at all times have an obligation to demonstrate the nature of Christ by being merciful to their enemies, always speaking the truth, etc. Some so-called military activities, then, are clearly off-limits, though I do not necessarily believe shooting a gun is one of them. I will suggest, however, that the idea of “just-war theory” is ultimately irrelevant to the Christian life; a Christian may fight in a so-called “just-war” and still behave in an un-Christ-like manner by torturing his enemies, delighting in their destruction, cursing, lying, etc. [end of digression]

         First of all, Christian ethics are God-centered rather than man-centered. In other words, my first question in any activity is not “how will this benefit humanity” or even “how many lives will this save” but rather “what would God have me to do?” I must stress at this point that to a certain degree God’s desire for his people may differ at different times. There is a difference between pre-exile Israel and Christians of this dispensation. The former often acted as God’s executioners during the conquest, while we, the latter, are commanded to pursue peace with all men (Hebrews 12:14).

         Secondly, Christian ethics presume upon the sovereignty of God in this regard: it is not up to us to determine the outcome of wars or the future of the human race. That lies solely in the hands of God. Thus, my responsibility is not necessarily to determine what will save the most lives in the long run. That is ultimately in the hands of God. My responsibility is to do right in the here and now (especially towards my neighbor) and trust that ultimately God holds sovereign control over both the minutia (who lives and dies) and the larger parts of history (war, etc.)

         Indeed, in light of this, it is ultimately arrogant to suggest that the end justifies the means, for that assumes that my “means” is what determines the “end,” when in reality only God determines the end.

         Thirdly, in light of points 1 and 2, above, I would suggest that my responsibility to God trumps any future consequences of my action or my inaction. In other words, if dropping an atomic bomb would seem to contradict a Christian ethic, than I have a responsibility to refrain from doing so no matter what the cost later on. For the Christian, the means is just as important as the end. Since the end is the glory of God, the means must reflect the end at all times. If the means deviates at any time from obeying God’s Word, then I cannot possibly attain the end of glorifying God.

         As far as WMDs are concerned, my argument depends on the following progression of thought: 1. killing an innocent person is murder; 2. the term ‘innocent’ includes civilians during wartime [at a minimum those not actively involved with the war effort, which certainly would include at least some people in any given city or town]; 3. Thus killing civilians in wartime is murder; 4. Thus WMDs dropped on civilian targets constitutes murder.”

Edmund Burke may certainly be correct by declaring that inactivity on our part may result in the “triumph of evil” (indeed, this seems to be a major theme of Ethos Effect). Nevertheless, if my activity to prevent an evil is, in of itself, by God’s definition, an evil activity, then my inactivity (or a different activity) would be more in keeping with God’s glory than my activity. Of course, this must be balanced by the fact that my inactivity in of itself may be evil. The resident of Nazi Germany who knew that his or her Jewish neighbors were in danger yet did nothing to help them is guilty of sin (Proverbs 24:11-12). Such a person is under a holy obligation to help innocent victims escape, yet the means of helping them escape must, as with everything else in our lives, be determined by asking “what does God's Word command?”

To conclude, then: what about the protagonist, Commander Van C. Albert? Did he do well to wipe out an entire planet? If there is no god, there what he did was “right” to the extent that we can determine what’s “right” from a purely humanistic foundation. Yet if there is a God, specifically the biblical God, Albert did wrong in that he presumed to act in the place of God by taking innocent lives.

Some links and brief thoughts on patriotism in the church

     Although generally I intend to follow the sidebar entitled “forthcoming blog posts,” nevertheless once in a while somebody will post something on their blog that gets the hamsters in my head spinning on their wheels and forces me to write. Recently my academic advisor posted two fascinating links on his own blog that I would like to share with you (http://www.daveblackonline.com/blog.htm Thursday March 31^st, 4:05 PM).

The first link is http://arbevere.blogspot.com/2011/03/we-must-reject-christendom.html Allan R. Bevere has written a forthcoming book that I am immensely interested in, entitled The Politics of Witness (Areopagus Critical Christian Issues; Energion, forthcoming). He offers this provocative quote on his website: “Functionally, by the church's political engagements and by aligning themselves with the left and the right, Democrats and Republicans, Christians in actuality display the unacknowledged belief that it is the nations that are indeed running the show.”

         Secondly, I am excited to read, on Nathan Akin’s blog (http://www.baptisttwentyone.com/?p=5285), a “Letter from a Minister about Patriotism in Corporate Worship” by music minister Carl Stam. Stam makes three key points on why his church will de-emphasize political celebration within the worship service on Memorial Day and July 4^th. I heartily concur with him, and would like to quote something Stam states in his first point: “It is just too easy to confuse what it means to follow Christ with what it means to be a loyal U.S. citizen. Especially when hard-hitting emotional presentations are made with flags and uniforms and pledges, it is too easy to get mixed up about where our allegiance should be. However, we ARE quick to pray for our country and for our leaders and we are quick to thank God for the freedom of worship that we enjoy.”

         Let me expand on that in light of my own theological "paradigm shift" over the past 6 years. In John 18:36, in response to Pilate, Jesus clearly states, “my kingdom is not of this world” (ESV). In Peter 2:9, it is the church, rather than any nation-state, that in this dispensation is given the title “a holy nation.” In light of that, Christians must be extremely careful about mixing in the glorification of any nation-state in with the glorification God when it comes to corporate worship.

         Let me take this a step further. In light of 1 Peter 2:9, I believe it is a misnomer to label any nation-state a “Christian nation”; in fact, by very definition, I believe there will be no “Christian nation” (other than the church, see 1 Pet 2:9) until Jesus Christ himself sits on the throne of David and rules the world from Jerusalem during the Millennium.

         Clearly God has blessed the US, but He has blessed all other nations as well, and ultimately we are forced to confess with Isaiah that “all the nations are as nothing before him, they are accounted by him as less than nothing and emptiness.” (Isa 40:17, ESV).

         One quick word to my fellow dispensationalists (with apologies to any Reformed or historic pre-mil reading this post; please bear with me as I deal with an “internal” matter). If indeed (as I firmly believe), God has done a unique work in this dispensation by founding the church at Pentecost, and if the church is to be distinct from both Israel and all other social-political entities, and if indeed Christ will reign someday in the future on the throne of David from a literal Jerusalem, then should not we dispensationalists be the first to recognize the danger of mixing nationalistic patriotism with corporate worship? Yet unfortunately the opposite has been true; we dispensationalists have, for all practical purposes, elevated the US to the position of both Israel and the church in God’s plan, despite the lack of Biblical support for any such position. We do so by glorifying the US in songs in church (though I have absolutely no problem with patriotic music outside the church, and can sing along in good conscience), pledging “allegiance” to the US flag (which, in my opinion, demonstrates that we truly do not understand the meaning of “allegiance”), and treating the constitution as if it were Scripture and the founding fathers as if they were inspired Apostles (e.g. I once heard Proverbs 22:28 applied from the pulpit to the US constitution). If anything, we dispensationalists need to be the first to recognize the dangers of such practices and to emphasize that among national entities, only Israel can claim such a massive role in God’s plan (though Scripture indicates that God will bless other nations as well, e.g. Isaiah 19:25; indeed, check out the entire context of this chapter).

         One more point: to those that are concerned that such a position means that I or others are somehow opening the door to the liberal, left-wing political agenda, let me quote Douglas Harink from his thought-provoking Brazos commentary on 1 Peter. While critiquing the journal First Things’ tendency to “often display in its pages a hope and vision for Christian America,” where “virtually all of the scriptural attributes of the mission of Israel and the church in the world, and God’s particular providence through them, are appropriated to the American nation,” Harink argues, “to be critical of that vision is not to be, as [Stephen H.] Webb suggests, ‘leftist’ or ‘liberal’; it is simply to assert a catholic theological vision of the people of God that accords with the teaching of scripture about the purpose of Israel and the church. Indeed, the leftist, liberal agenda gets its own vision and champion of Christian American in the journal Sojourners and in Jim Wallis’s God’s Politics . . . Wallis no less than Webb appropriates the attributes and mission of Israel and the church to the American nation and calls the church to serve it” (Harink, 1&2 Peter [Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos, 2009], 59 fn50). A middle-ground is needed that recognizes that both “left” and “right” politics are ultimately irrelevant to the Kingdom of God. Some issues, such as abortion, do indeed hold spiritual significance and should command our attention, but the Christian’s response is first and foremost to be that of a “do-gooder” (1 Peter 2:11-12) rather than a political revolutionary.

         So much for “brief thoughts!” I do hope to write more on this topic in the future. For now, I urge the reader to check out the above posts and to read Douglas Harink’s commentary on 1 Peter, especially on 1 Peter 1 and 2. While I don’t agree with all of what Harink writes, I am grateful that he is dealing with issues that most commentaries on 1 Peter do not.

Guest essay by John R. Himes: "Is Translation Possible?"

John R. Himes is a veteran missionary to Japan and currently involved in a new translation of the Greek New Testament into Japanese

Is Translation Possible?

By John R. Himes

We sometimes hear it said, “Translation is really impossible. You can’t completely get meaning from one language to another.” Is this true, or a sort of linguistic myth? My money is on the myth and here’s why.

First of all, let’s track down the sources of the myth. There are apparently two original sources of the idea that translation is impossible: a linguist (and his disciple) and a philosopher. The linguist was Edward Sapir (1884-1939), one of the pioneers of scientific linguistics in the early 20^th century, whose disciple Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941) embroidered and expanded Sapir’s teachings into what came to be called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, also called the principle of linguistic relativity. The philosopher was Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), influential in the areas of existentialism and logical positivism.

Let’s consider the linguist first. Sapir didn’t write a whole lot, but his influence far outweighs his output. He is best known for his 1921 book Language, with the subtitle, “An Introduction to the Study of Speech,” in which he referred to Benedetto Croce saying, “Croce is therefore perfectly right in saying that a work of literary art can never be translated” (Edward Sapir, Language, 2004 reprint. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004, 183). Notice that Sapir was speaking of literature in particular, but his disciple Whorf apparently expanded his teaching to include all translation. Whorf’s hypothesis was that language shapes thought, rather than the other way around. Therefore, translation is impossible because one cannot truly break free of his language and culture. An interesting application of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is in 1984, the famous novel of the future in which George Orwell has the oppressive government invent Newspeak, a language used to indoctrinate and imprison the people.

Now, if the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is true, and language affects thought rather than the other way around, then true translation is truly impossible. Culture through language becomes the arbiter of truth, and universal truth or revelation from God is a non starter. Kwame Anthony Appiah put it this way: “If that (the SWH) were true, it would affect what thoughts you could intend to express also. If what language you speak determines what thoughts or intentions you can have, translation, thus conceived, will always be impossible” (“Thick Translation,” in The Translation Studies Reader, 2^nd ed., ed. by Lawrence Venuti. New York and London: Routledge, 2004, 392)

However, this hypothesis was formulated in the early days of the discipline of modern linguistics. It is largely debunked nowadays, according to Daniel Chandler: “Whilst few linguists would accept the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its ‘strong’, extreme or deterministic form, many now accept a ‘weak’, more moderate, or limited Whorfianism, namely that the ways in which we see the world may be influenced by the kind of language we use” (Daniel Chandler, The Act of Writing, Aberystwyth: University of Wales, 1995, 18)

In particular, the concept of a universal grammar posited by Noam Chomsky and others has effectively opposed Sapir-Whorf’s linguistic relativity. Discussing German translation scholar Wolfram Wilss, Edwin Gentzler explains: “Wilss reacts against the Sapir/Whorf school of thought, which denies the a priori existence of universal categories of thought and whose followers have a skeptical view of the possibility that two languages might share a common core of experience. To dismiss this line of reasoning, Wilss cites first Chomsky and then Eric H. Lenneberg, whose The Biological Foundations of Language (1967) posited biological universals in language. Wilss suggests that the Chomsky/Lenneberg view of language universals ‘proceeds from the hypothesis, undisputed to date, that there are semantic and syntactic universals, including universal pragmatics; this holds true in many if not all natural languages’ (Wilss, 1982: 39)” (Edwin Gentzler Contemporary Translation Theories, Revised 2nd ed. Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 2001, 64).

The other primary source for the belief that translation is impossible was Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is harder to track down anything definitive about Wittgenstein’s view of translation than it is for Sapir. Professor Mark Farnham of Calvary Baptist Theological Seminary supplied me with the following Wittgenstein quote which shows his view of language as relativistic: “For a large class of cases—though—not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, paragraph 43. Much thanks to Prof. Farnham). A relativistic view of language makes real translation impossible.

Furthermore, the rejection of metaphysics as meaningless by the logical positivists such as Wittgenstein was makes it a philosophy virtually impossible for a Christian to accept (Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith. London: Tyndale Press, 1969, 168-176). Therefore Wittgenstein’s view that translation is impossible is also unacceptable due to its dependence on logical positivism. Also, from a practical point of view, one is forced to wonder if “linguistic analysis” (what logical positivism developed into) as done by non-linguist philosophers is even partly valid!

Unfortunately, unlike Sapir-Whorf, the influence of Wittgenstein continues in the polysystem theory of Israeli translation studies scholar Gideon Toury. “Borrowing from Ludwig Wittgenstein the concept of family of resemblances, Toury now views ‘original’ texts as containing clusters of properties, meanings, possibilities. All translations privilege certain properties/meanings at the expense of others, and the concept of a ‘correct’ translation ceases to be a real possibility” (Gentzler, op cit, 126-127).

So, are they right? For our purposes, is Bible translation even possible? Let’s consider that from the Scriptures themselves. First of all, remember that the Bible is inspired by God to present His truth to us. As Christ Himself said, “Thy word is truth” (John 17:17, KJV). It stands to reason from a theological standpoint that truth from the omniscient God is universal, and thus ought to be communicable in any language. Compare this thought to what Sapir said about the possibility of translating scientific truth: “A scientific truth is impersonal, in its essence it is untinctured by the particular linguistic medium in which it finds expression. It can as readily deliver its message in Chinese as in English” (Sapir, op. cit., 184). Truth is translatable!

Again, consider the issue of translation within the Bible itself. Remember that the writers, as moved by the Holy Spirit, included various words and even sentences, complete with their translation. Notable examples include the cry of Christ on the cross, “Eli, eli, lama sabachthani” (Matt. 27:46, Mark 15:34), and “Talitha kumi” (Mark 5:41). Therefore it is obvious that in God’s eyes translation is completely possible.

We can go further and say that the translation of the Bible is desirable because it is the will of God. We can base this on the Great Commission, particularly the version in Matthew 28:18-20. If we are to make disciples out of the nations and teach new disciples all that Jesus taught, we must have translators who will make available the Bible in every language. May their tribe increase!

How to Care and Pray for Japan

     As a missionary kid from Japan whose parents are still ministering over there, I'd like to share with any readers some specific ways to help and pray for Japan.
     Ministry in Japan: Disaster opens up opportunities for the Gospel and compassion. One missionary, a friend of my family since the early 80s, is planning to load up on relief supplies and Gospel tracts and head down to the Sendai area. In addition, I can only imagine the witnessing opportunities that may spring up as people grapple with the questions of life, suffering, disaster, and eternity.
      I trust that any who were planning trips to Japan specifically for the sake of ministry will continue with the plans despite what has happened; while the dangers are real, so are the opportunities and Japan now than ever needs willing Christains to come along side and both live and proclaim the Gospel. I am grateful that I know of at least one ministry, a camping ministry,  which is going through with its plans to visit and work in Japan, despite the disaster.
     In addition, financial aid is always needed. The Red Cross, of course, seems to be relatively quick to respond to disasters (http://www.redcross.org). My parents' mission board, Baptist World Mission, has also been organizing its own relief effort (http://www.baptistworldmission.org/component/content/article/1266-japan-earthquake-relief-effort.html) Although giving should never be viewed as an opportunity for "getting off the hook" as far as mission work goes (i.e. we still have an obligation to get our lives, not just our wallets, involved in missions), nevertheless we know from Philippians 4:15-18 that giving in of itself may be considered a ministry, especially when it is done sacrificially.
      Prayer for Japan: 1. First of all, pray that the Gospel may gain a foothold. As I was flying home the other day, the man in a chair in front of me was reading a paper where the headline ran something like "In time of distress, Japanese rely on traditional beliefs," a headline flanked by a picture of a Buddhist temple. This naturally leads us to think of 1 Peter 1:18, "your empty way of life inherited from your ancestors" (NET). Japan has always placed a heavy emphasis on tradition, and Christianity has been viewed with suspicion as a "foreign religion" (never mind that technically Buddhism would also be a "foreign religion"). Nevertheless the Spirit possesses the power to make inroads into the heart with the news of Christ's death and resurrection.
     2. Secondly, prayer is needed for the survivors, both those that are safe but lacking many of the basic conveniences of modern life, and those that may still be awaiting rescue. Continued safety should also be prayed for, as the potential for nuclear meltdown looms ominously on the horizon.
     3. Thirdly, pray for those involved in the rescue effort, especially the JSDF (the Japan Self-Defense Force). One of my Japanese friends from my high school days, "Toshi," is in the JSDF and has currently been deployed to the Sendai area. I pray that the Lord will grant the JSDF both courage and safety as they seek to help those in need.

Prayer and Compassion for Japan

     I trust that believers all around the world are praying for grace in the midst of the great catastrophe that has hit Japan. This is also an appropriate opportunity to remind Christians that prayer and works of compassion reflect the very character of God. In other words, Christians are not just supposed to help others in hopes that wet get the opportunity to witness to them (though all the better if that happens!). Rather, Christians are to help others, expecting nothing in return, because that is a reflection of the character of God himself! Thus, "be merciful, even as your father is merciful" (Luke 6:36, ESV).
     Clearly the Christian is not to allow concern for physical or socio-economical needs trump spiritual needs. Our job first-and-foremost is to be heralds of the kingdom. Neglect of proclaiming the gospel (Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptrues, and was buried, and rose again) is inexcusible.
     Nevertheless, often we as Christians have become so caught up in proclaiming that we forget about doing. Christ performed acts of kindness throughout his ministry not because it caused people to listen to him more, and not because it helped his ministry. Rather, Christ performed acts of kindness because he was the Son of God and consequently "had compassion on them" (Matthew 14:14, ESV)
     My challange, then, is this: whenever we hear of a disaster or whenever we see those in need, our first reaction should be to pray and to ask, "How can I help?" It is the Christian's duty to show compassion for the sake of showing compassion, because compassion itself is a character trait of God the Father. If the Lord allows us the opportunity to help somebody, then we can rejoice that we are reflecting the ethic of God.

Resources for Greek students

     One of the things I admire about many of those on my blogroll (e.g. Dr. David Black, Nick Norelli) is their willingness to take the time to direct students to helpful resources. In light of that, I'd like to share three resources here that have been especially beneficial in my own studies, beginning with my college days through doctoral work.
     1. Sakae Kubo, A Reader's Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1975). It goes without saying that, for any true student of Biblical Greek, actually reading one's Greek New Testament on a consistent basis is paramount. Here, then, is where Kubo's Reader's Lexicon provides an invaluable service. Unlike regular lexicons, Kubo deals with Biblical words on a verse-by-verse basis, providing definitions for the rarer Greek words as they appear in a particular New Testament book. If a student has memorized all words appearing 50 or more times in the NT, then you can read the entire Greek New Testament with Kubo at your side, without having to read through a massive, alphabetized tome such as BDAG.
      2.  This next source is not one you're likely to find in most lists of Greek reference works. Yet for practical value, it is hard to beat the Langenscheidt Pocket Greek Dictionary: Classical Greek-English, ed. by Karl Feyerabend (Maspeth, NY: Langenscheidt, n.d.) While not concerned with Biblical Greek per se, the Langenscheidt dictionary can help you study any ancient Greek source, whether classical or Koine. The other day I used it to help me work through Chrysostom's brief discussion of First Peter 1:6-8; 1:18-21; and 2:7-8 for my dissertation. To my surprise, I had significantly less trouble then expected. Granted, Chrysostom not exactly on the level of Philo, but neverthelss, considering the fact that this is a "pocket size" dictionary, I believe it's worth more than its retail price. The interested reader may also note that Langenscheidt also produces pocket dictionaries for modern German and French, though so far I have found the German one less helpful than the Greek and French dictionary.
      3. For research purposes, I am beginning to become more and more excited about the possibilities of AbeBooks (http://www.abebooks.com). Time after time they have come through for me with a rare German or French book which is important to my research, a book that is difficult to find in the States. A few months ago I purchased and received Ceslas Spicq's French commentary on 1 Peter (his commentary on Hebrews is common enough in the US, but his 1 Peter commentary, so far I can determine, only exists in one library outside of Europe). Two days ago I purchased a German dissertation (H. Goldstein's "Das Gemeindeverständnis des ersten Petrusbriefs," Münster, 1973), a work that appears to possess great value for my own dissertation and which, so far as I could determine, does not exist in the US (ah, if I only I had the money to travel to Europe!) For the doctoral student pulling his or her hair out trying to track down rare German or French sources, give Abe a try. Like Amazon Marketplace, Abe deals with a multitude of individual dealers, so discretion is advised. So far, though, I have not had a problem with either prices (generally reasonable) or delivery.

Book alert for students of modern church history! Andrew Himes provides a unique perspective on fundamentalism in the 20th century

     My uncle, Andrew Himes, and my father, John R. Himes, are both grandsons of noted fundamentalist evangelist John R. Rice (founder of the Sword of the Lord publishing company). Despite their shared heritage, they have taken two significantly different paths in their lives. Now my Uncle Andy is set to publish a unique take on fundamentalist Christianity in the 20th century with his forthcoming book, The Sword of the Lord: The Roots of Fundamentalistm in an American Family (see http://www.amazon.com/Sword-Lord-Fundamentalism-American-Family/dp/1453843752/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1298981236&sr=1-1)
      The book is currently in its prepublication stage; once it's published, I hope to do a full review on it, possibly with further discussion on the identity and influence of fundamentalism within broader evangelicalism. For now, suffice it to say that  Andrew Himes provides a well-researched (including primary sources as well as ph.d. dissertations, etc.), intimate look into one of the major influences within both fundamentalism and conservative evangelicalsim of the early-to-mid 20th century. In addition, he deals with such divese topics as revivalism in the early 20th century, race and religion in the South, the early years of the National Association of Evangelicals (of which both Rice and Bob Jones played a part in), etc. At the least this has the potential to provide a welcome companion piece to George Marsden's works for any student of 20th century fundamentalism and evangelicalism.

The Granville Sharp rule: A defense of Daniel Wallace in light of Stanley Porter's review

In 2009, Daniel Wallace was finally able to publish his dissertation of some years ago under the title Granville Sharp’s Canon and its Kin: Semantics and Significance (Studies in Biblical Greek 14; New York: Peter Lang, 2009). While this particular work was slow in coming, Wallace has made clear his views on the Granville Sharp rule in other articles as well as his excellent Greek Grammar: Beyond the Basics.

In the latest volume of The Journal of the Evangelical Society 53:4 (December 2010), pp. 828-832, Stanley Porter has published a lengthy and mostly negative review. While I will be the first to acknowledge Porter’s brilliance as a linguistic, and while I also appreciate his overall moderate tone of critique, and while there is one area of Porter’s critique that I will agree with him on, nevertheless Porter has not himself adequately examined Granville Sharp’s Remarks on the Uses of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament and thus makes two statements, central to his critique of Wallace, that are inaccurate. It is my sincere desire that my essay here is not overly critical of Porter (and Porter himself always keeps a moderate tone in his discussions, one that I hope to emulate); ultimately my rhetoric is driven more by a desire to defend Wallace against what I feel is an unfair review than any desire to criticize Porter.

Before we begin, the reader should note that this discussion assumes a basic knowledge of Wallace’s position. Furthermore, this discussion revolves around Granville Sharp’s Remarks on the Uses of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament (3^rd ed.; London: 1803). This work is available for free from Google Books; as of today, the proper link is http://books.google.com/books?id=e1oXAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=granville+sharp&hl=en&ei=gtdTYzZC8eCtge4naTiCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

In other words, the reader can easily verify for his or herself what Wallace, Porter, and I claim that Sharp is saying, Indeed, anyone who wishes to study out the issue is strongly encouraged to read Sharp’s work for themselves. Needless to say, any page numbers I refer to from Sharp’s work are the actual page numbers of the manuscript, not the pdf page numbers.

Also, the reader should note that we are concerned with Sharp’s rule #1 here, not necessarily with the other rules (though the other rules relate to the first rule; indeed, Sharp himself states, “the rules which follow are intended only to illustrate the particularity of the several sentences which fall under the first rule . . .” (Sharp, Remarks, 7).

To begin with, after citing Wallace’s articulation of Sharp’s rule, Porter claims that “Sharp does not address the question of plurals” (829, six lines from the top). This is inexplicable since a few lines down Porter discusses just how exactly Sharp does deal with plurals. Porter (829) cites Wallace who is citing Sharp (Sharp, Remarks, p. 6), where Sharp states “except the nouns be proper names, or in the plural number, in which case there are many exceptions.” This statement by Sharp is still under the heading of “Rule I.” Porter (review, 829) argues that Wallace neglects to add the following comment by Sharp that “there are not wanting examples, even of plural nouns, which are expressed exactly agreeable to this rule” (Sharp, 6). Yet in response to Porter, how does this disprove Wallace’s argument? How can it be any more clearer that Sharp does say that plural nouns are not part of the rule? Indeed: “except the nouns be proper names or in the plural number.” The fact that Sharp admits that some plural nouns act similar to the singular nouns here does not mean that the rule applies to plural nouns! (Porter himself omits one word of Sharp: “though”; in other words, what Sharp says is “though there are not wanting examples . . .” [Sharp, 6], which would seem to indicate that Sharp’s statement is almost an aside here). If I make the statement, “all land-based animals breathe air; there are no exceptions to this rule” and then follow this up with “however, some water-based animals (e.g. whales) also breathe air,” would it be legitimate to say that the rule is just as much about the former as it is about the latter (especially if the rule is a couple hundred words and the term “water-breathing” is only mentioned once?) Hardly! Indeed, in Sharp’s rule, the issue of plural nouns only occurs in one sentence (twice in two independent clauses in that sentence), and not a single one of his NT examples for his rule are plural constructions (Sharp, 4-5)

All Sharp is saying, as an aside, is that some plural nouns seem to follow the pattern. But the rule itself is strictly for singular personal nouns: this is apparent if we go back and read Sharp’s formulation of the rule on pages 3, which refers to “person” in the singular (“ . . . the latter always relates to the same person . . . i.e. it denotes a farther description of the first-named person”) Simply because Sharp casually observed that there are quite a few examples of plural nouns in TSKS constructions that refer to the same group does not change the fact that his rule refers to singular nouns; I cannot think of anyway Sharp himself could have made this clear other than his own statement on p. 6, “except the nouns be proper names, or in the plural number.” In the NT there are quite a few instances where plural nouns refer in a TSKS construction refer to different groups (e.g. Matthew 3:7), whereas with singular, personal nouns (not proper names), there are almost no exceptions (in fact, I believe in the NT no exceptions at all). The contrast between the two types of constructions (singular vs. plural) is striking, and both Wallace and Sharp have realized that.

More seriously, however, on page 829 of his review Porter makes the following statement: “Wallace further stresses that Sharp means that the substantives must have an ‘identical referent’ . . . however, that is not what the rule says. It is only when Sharp is discussing Christological significant examples that he uses such terms as ‘identity of person(s)’ (Sharp, Remarks 28, 30). Wallace seems to have a narrower view of the rule than did Sharp himself.”

In response to Porter, I urge the reader to consider the following statements by Sharp himself: 1. “When two personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative kai, if the former has the definitive article, and the latter has not, they both relate to the same person” (Sharp, Remarks xxxix, in the table of contents). 2. When the copulative kai . . . the latter always relates to the same person that is expressed or described by the first noun or participle: i.e. it denotes a farther description of the first-named person.” (Sharp, 3; this is the formulation of the rule proper). My own emphasis has been added in both cases. Now, please compare what Sharp says vs. what Porter says—“they both relate to the same person” and “always relates to the same person” vs. “[Wallace’s assertion that] the substantives must have an ‘identical referent’ . . . is not what the rule says.”

If Sharp states that both substantives refer to the same person (“both relate to the same person” is his exact statement), then does not that logically imply “an identical referent”? How can two words refer to the same person and yet not be said to have an identical referent? Thus we see that Wallace is correct and Porter has, unfortunately, misrepresented Sharp’s rule. The reader is advised not to take my word for it but to download their own free copy from Google Books and examine the evidence for themselves.

Thus, contra Porter, the following must be observed: 1. Sharp’s rule deals with plurals in that it  clearlyexcludes them and makes it clear that the rule is meant to apply to singular nouns, not plural nouns or proper names (even though, as an aside, Sharp mentions that some plural TSKS constructions do fit the pattern); and, more importantly, 2. Sharp’s rule is concerned with identical referents.

Another area that Porter is unfair to Wallace is when he accuses him of allowing Christological concerns to trump a proper understanding of Sharp’s rule (Porter, 831, last paragraph). Yet Sharp himself is the one who saw in “Rule #1” the means to prove the deity of Christ in Scripture. The reader is advised to note especially Sharp, Remarks, top of page 3 (last sentence before “Rule I”) and page 7 (before the heading “Rule II”). Although Sharp himself was concerned with the rule strictly in NT Greek and not Koine Greek in general, it is understandable why Sharp and Wallace would be excited about the rule; if it could be established that in TSKS constructions (article + substantive + kai+ substantive), when the construction is personal, singular, and not a proper name (which, as I have argued above, is obviously how Sharp qualified it; once again the reader is advised to read for themselves Sharp’s Remarks, pp. xxxix and 3-7), then the construction (at least in the NT) always refers to the same person (there are no exceptions to this in the New Testament, that I know of; this applies equally to theological and non-theological texts; in contrast, there are a significantly large number of plural and non-personal TSKS constructions  in the NT and in Koine that do not have the same referent). Since there are no exceptions in the NT, than naturally one could view this as a deliberate construction specifically used by a Greek writer or speaker to refer to the same person. Thus, when it applies to God [which is not a proper name] and Savior, where Jesus Christ is the referent of the latter, then one could naturally assume that He is also the referent of the former. This is strengthened if indeed the rule holds true in other Koine documents.

Obviously Porter himself believes in the deity of Christ or he would hardly be publishing in JETS! What Porter is objecting to (see Porter, pp. 831-832, the last paragraph of his review) is the way Wallace uses the Granville Sharp rule to attempt to prove Christ’s deity. What I am arguing here is that what Wallace is doing is being true to Sharp’s original observations, that Sharp himself thought that the rule could be used to prove Christ’s divinity simply because it was without exception in the NT (and Wallace and I would both add with very few exceptions in the vast scope of Koine literature).

Thus Sharp’s formulation of the rule, contra Porter, was not meant to be “a usable general principle . . . . that establishes that elements under a common article are related to each other, and in some circumstances are meant to be equated with each other” (Porter, 831-832, last sentence in the review). Once again, the reader should examine Sharp’s own words: in a TSKS construction with “two personal nouns of the same case . . . the latter always relates to the same person” [Sharp, Remarks, 3; emphasis added; notice the last two words: “same person”; this implies a singular, personal construction, not a plural or impersonal construction]. The reader will forgive my confusion if I wonder how we can go from Sharp’s statement to Porter’s significantly broader statement “elements under a common article are related to each other, and in some circumstance are meant to be equated with each other” (Porter, 832, last sentence).

I hope that at this point we have established what Sharp actually said. The question is, of course, was Sharp right? At this point we must argue out that no rule in any language is going to have perfect conformity within that language, and also that rules change overtime. Thus Porter is correct in taking Wallace to task for trying to hard to get rid certain exceptions to the rule (829-831). In a sense, Porter may be right that Wallace engages in “special pleading” (Porter, 829). Nevertheless, I ask the reader: if a particular construction acts a particular way in 99 percent of the time, do the 1 percent of exceptions invalidate any rule based on the 99 percent? In mathematics and science, no doubt, but I would argue not so in language.

For example, I can make the statement that in Japanese it is expected that an employee will address his boss with a certain type of verb ending (the honorific verb endings); thus a casual asou or souka (“is that so?”), when addressed to a superior, should take the honorific ending (asoudesuka or soudesuka?) The fact that exceptions exist to this rule (e.g. when one is drunk or when one is a foreigner learning still learning the language) does not invalidate that cultural and linguistic rule/principle/whatever you wish to call it!

Furthermore, I imagine that statistically the odds are too great that it is a coincidence that singular, personal TSKS constructions would act that way while plural and impersonal TSKS constructions are not even comparable in their behavior (in fact, my own unverified suspicion at this point is that TSKS constructions that are plural and/or impersonal most of the time do not have the same identity; at least from the LXX I can make a strong case for that, for now).

Ironically, Wallace’s dismissal of “translation Greek” (see Porter, 830, #(2)), deprives him of what I believe is a further prove of the general validity of Sharp’s rule #1. My own studies in the Septuagint have convinced me that Proverbs 24:21 is an anomaly—even the translators of the LXX treated TSKS constructions in the way that Sharp and Wallace outlined. The reader is advised to take the following singular, personal constructions—Ezra 7:21, Nehemiah 8:9, Isaiah 24:20, Tobit 1:22, I Esdras 8:8, 8:9, 9:39, 9:42, and 9:49, all referring to the same person—and contrast them with TSKS constructions that do not meet that criteria: (e.g. Exodus 9:3; Psalm 88 (89): 13; etc.). My research is fairly limited at this point, but everything I’ve seen indicate that even the translators of the LXX seemed to take the TSKS constructions in the same way that the NT and other documents in Koine Greek do. The odds are too high that the significant difference between singular and personal TSKS constructions and other TSKS constructions is coincidental.

While Wallace’s treatment of the topic is hardly perfect, and while I believe Porter is actually more moderate and gentler in the debate than Wallace is, nevertheless I believe Wallace has more accurately understood Sharp’s rule than Porter has, and that Sharp’s original articulation of the rule stands remarkably in Koine Greek. If Wallace’s thesis has any major fault, it lies in his attempt to argue away what may be valid exceptions to the rule, valid exceptions that are nevertheless a drop in the bucket of the vast amount of Koine TSKS constructions that were deliberately meant to indicate a single person under two headings or titles.